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Reviewed by Sarah J. Reynolds*

Russian Law: The End of the Soviet System and the Role of Law is
one of only a few book-length works on Soviet/Russian law to be published in the last year or more and the only one to attempt as broad a
treatment of the subject as Professor Feldbrugge attempts here. The speed
and depth of change in the subject area have discouraged potential
authors, and thus the field has remained, at a critical period, without an
up-to-date general text and without the broad, systemic analyses that are
so important to an understanding of the nature of the change. Professor
Feldbrugge deserves great praise for producing an ambitious work to fill
this gap in the literature. The book provides a wealth of information and
will be especially valuable to those new to the subject. The very breadth
of the work, however, requires a sweeping, often simplified, analysis that
occasionally appears somewhat one-dimensional. Moreover, since the
book's perspective is, in large part, historical, the analysis is primarily
backward-looking. Readers, especially those who may want to use
Professor Feldbrugge's analysis of the system's development and flaws
as a guide for the evaluation, or even the design of Russian reform
efforts, should not mistake his broad historical analysis for prescription.
Professor Feldbrugge describes his approach to his task as one of
"concentrical circles,"' but the book more closely resembles three separate
and nearly distinct pieces. Part I, "The Soviet System," is primarily
analytical, presenting a broad and wide-ranging discussion of Professor
Feldbrugge's views on the history and development of Soviet society and
the totalitarian nature of Soviet society and Soviet law. The middle part,
by far the lengthiest, is primarily descriptive, discussing Soviet era law
and perestroikaera changes in a wide variety of legal fields, with special
emphasis on constitutional law and state structure. The last part is a

* Director for Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States of the Harvard Law
School Program on International Financial Systems.
1. FJ.M. FELDBRUGGE, RUSSIAN LAW: THE END OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE ROLE
OF LAW xi (1993).

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

(Vol. 15:797

documents supplement for the text, containing a translation of the Russian
Constitution as amended to publication date, and of the Federation Treaty,
along with a list of major perestroika era legislation and executive acts
in the Soviet Union and Russia and a bibliographical note on further
sources.
Perhaps because of the dearth of publications, Professor Feldbrugge
has attempted to use this format not only to cover an extremely broad
subject area, but also to do so in a fashion that serves the needs of all
audiences. As he describes his aim, it is to produce a book suitable not
exclusively for "law students, or sovietologists, or practitioners, or
comparative lawyers." 2 The task Professor Feldbrugge thus sets himself
is Herculean and, in the final balance, probably impossible. His need to
provide a great deal of basic information to students and others who have
little knowledge of the subject overshadows the work's more sophisticated
and complex themes. Part I's discussion ranges from the historical and
political origins of the Bolshevik revolution and the Soviet system, to the
theories and personal styles of Marx and Lenin, to the nature of a
totalitarian system, to the causes of that system's collapse. The role and
meaning of law itself receive only a fraction of part I's attention, and
while the author presents his thoughts clearly, he does not expound them
in detail. Although in part I he indicates that he will extend his analysis
into the discussion of specific areas of law in part II, the references in
part II are often brief and point to illustrations rather than developing the
broad points made in part I.
The limits placed on the book's analytical position do not detract
from its value as a unique source of information on the process by which
the law, in the early period of perestroika,began to move away from old
Soviet models toward a new Russian system. More knowledgeable
readers, however, may sometimes find themselves wishing that the author
had pursued in more depth and detail the analytical treatment of the role
of law which is promised in the title and hinted at early in the book.
Professor Feldbrugge presents a rather sweeping dismissal of the role of
law in relation to other aspects of the system, but gives little time to the
discussion of the role of law outside this comparison or to the way in
which the law and the legal system may (or could, or must) change as
Russia undertakes sweeping social transformation.
Professor Feldbrugge's view of Soviet law, and the analysis presented
in the book, are grounded in his conception of the Soviet state as
totalitarian. By totalitarian, he means a state which "tends to monopolize

2. Id. at ix-x.
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power in the sphere of politics, economics, and the life of society."3 The
totalitarian state attempts to control all aspects of the life and function of
its society and to destroy that which it cannot control. Despite an

insistence on an all-encompassing ideology, the totalitarian state eventually comes to be concerned exclusively with its own preservation rather
than any social good and seeks that preservation at any cost to individuals
or society. Inevitably, according to Professor Feldbrugge, the majority of
the Soviet state's citizens came to recognize the nature of the situation,
but most were unable to speak publicly for fear of reprisals. This situation
lead to a "schizophrenic" society in which what was said publicly and
what was said privately were unrelated, or even direct opposites.
As the description suggests, the degree of power and of central
control achieved by such a state must be extreme, or it could not prevent
the disillusioned populace from changing the arrangement. Although
Professor Feldbrugge's initial definition of the totalitarian state notes
specifically that it is not possible for any state to control everything, he
believes that the Soviet state achieved an unusual and very extreme
degree of both control and centralization, not only of political power and
institutions, but also of the economy, of the law, and of all of the
institutions of civil society. Moreover, although some statements would
seem to indicate a clear sense that the motives of the state, and those of
individuals, are always complex, much of the discussion seems to assume
that the state made policy and exercised state power with a singularity of
purpose approaching, or exceeding, the anthropomorphic. No state action
taken or policy made by the totalitarian state has any goal other than
increasing or maintaining state control, and the appearance of other
rationales is simply a fagade erected by the state to fool its citizens or the
rest of the world. The author is quite clear about his own opinion of this
system-persona. He refers to it as repulsive and strongly suggests that he
would characterize it as "a wholly negative phenomenon in which the
darkest forces of European and Russian history combined to produce the
most vicious regime in world history."4
This overarching understanding of the nature and function of the
Soviet state through much of its history - an understanding long shared
in its basic elements by many scholars, commentators, and policymakers,
joined now by some reformers - is the lens through which Feldbrugge
views each of the institutions of that society individually, including the
law. Ironically, while the view provided by that lens is likely to make
those peering through it most desirous of change, its single issue focus

3. Id. at 3.
4. Ud

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 15:797

and occasional overbreadth may lead to approaches which make wellcrafted, lasting reform more difficult.
I. THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM
Although the book's title seems to promise an extensive treatment of
the role of law in the Soviet system and in the remaking of post-Soviet
Russian society, the proportion of the book spent in direct discussion of
the role of law as such is quite small. This is in great measure a result of
the combination of the author's definition of law with his understanding
of the system.
In beginning to approach the question of the role of law in a totalitarian society, Feldbrugge offers two definitions of law. One of these
characterizes law as one of a number of complex methods used by a
society for the resolution of conflicts.' The law method of conflict
resolution refers primarily to the formal legal system of conflict resolution (i.e. courts) and to the institutions that usually accompany such a
formal system, such as a professional class of actors (judges, lawyers, law
enforcement officers) and professionalized legal education. For
Feldbrugge, however, the list of institutions essential to a system of law
includes a great deal more than the standard building blocks of a system
for the legal resolution of disputes, it also includes such social and
political attributes as separation of powers and Rechtsstaat or rule of law.
Since it is clear that the Soviet legal system and Soviet social and
political structure lacked these other attributes for most of their history,6
the inescapable conclusion would seem to be that the Soviet Union had
no law in the sense of Feldbrugge's conflicts-resolution definition of law.
Although the author does not explicitly state this conclusion, it may
explain why he does not employ the definition further in his analysis.
Feldbrugge's alternate definition, and the one that he appears to rely
on in most of his book, is law as "a system of rules, emanating from certain
authoritative agencies in society." 7 These agencies are, of course, the same
central organs which exercised the central control and self-preservation

5. Id. at 27.
6. Soviet legal and political theory rejected entirely the notion of separation of powers
until 1988-90. At that point the concept began to be publicly discussed and reconsidered as a
part of perestroika, and a number of fundamental changes were introduced to create a
separation of powers in the Soviet state structure. Thus, there was no separation of powers until
that time and, arguably, there continued to be none after several steps had been taken
attempting to create it. It is equally clear that Rechtsstaat,in the sense of a strict adherence by
the state to its own laws, and rule of law, in the traditional sense which encompasses both
adherence to law and to a concept of right or justice which may extend beyond the letter of the
law, was not an overarching attribute of the Soviet system of law.
7. Id. at 26.
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around which Feldbrugge's understanding of the Soviet system revolves.
Having already defined the goals of the system and its elite, Feldbrugge's
conclusions about the role of law during the Soviet period follow logically:
It would be unrealistic therefore to look upon law as a foreign
body within the totalitarian system, to cherish expectations that such
a system would gradually become more civilized, liberal and humane,
if it could only be persuaded to observe its own laws. Soviet law,
and its begetter, the Soviet state, were entirely part of the Soviet
system and did not have any potential to develop into independent
constraints upon this system. It was only when the system itself began
to disintegrate that law could acquire a role for itself and become a
catalyst in the disintegration process
This definition of the role of law is tellingly focused on the ability of
law to serve as a counterweight to "the system" or a catalyst for change
from the inside. Yet there are many other questions which could be asked:
Given that the law supported the existing political structure, did it also serve
other functions, such as the protection of public order or the expression
of public values? Why did the "system" move in the directions of
increasing "legality" - in the sense of increasing formalization of goals
and values through laws, regulation, and procedural requirements? Was
this simply a more efficient way to exercise central control, or did it express
other preferences as well? How did/do the citizens regard the law? What
portions of it would they change, and in what ways, if offered the chance
to decide individually? How was/is the law in Feldbrugge's definition i.e., the issued rules - related to the actual behavior of citizens and
institutions?
Feldbrugge does not address any of these questions directly. This
omission is clearly, in part, a matter of space limitations. However, viewing
the role of law through the lens of Feldbrugge's description of totalitarianism, they may simply not be questions worth asking.
When the degree of abuse involved in a political arrangement - or
in another form of human social relationship - is perceived as extreme
and unacceptable under any circumstances, it is difficult to view discussions
of the positive points of the system or the ways in which its parts work
together as useful - except where this is related to condemning and ending
the abuse. Take as an analogy an extremely abusive domestic relationship
or a system of personal bondage. For those concerned to end the system,
discussions of other aspects of the relationship - control of household
funds, the "rules" by which the system of bondage operates, the views of

8. Id. at 29.
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the victims of the abuse - are only interesting to the extent that they
contribute to stopping the abuse. Where it has been concluded, as
Feldbrugge concludes about the totalitarian system, that the essence of the
relationship (system) is itself the abuse (control), then claims that other
purposes or values are also served by some elements of the system are
irrelevant, or even repugnant and callous. A victim's perception that the
relationship is worthwhile and should be preserved cannot be understood
as anything other than self-deception. By definition, that which supports
the system is bad, and as Feldbrugge believes that (again, be definition)
all law in the Soviet totalitarian state supported the system, there is little
room for discussion.
It is precisely the questions which seem least relevant in this perspective, however, which become most relevant when the system is ready
for change. It is not possible to develop new social structures - including
new law - without building upon the old. This assertion does not imply
that the old structures must be retained in some form, but rather that careful
choices must be made to allow new structures to be developed which meet
the needs and interests of the people and allow them to change at a human
pace. An approach that sees only the system-maintaining functions of Soviet
era legal rules will have difficulty with citizen demands that some of the
old rights and powers be made real and enforceable rather than entirely
replaced. Without respect for the way in which the publicly announced
rationales for the law were, in part, a reflection of the public's values, the
analyst and the reformer may be unable to give credibility to expressions
of doubt about change. The result may be both a recommendation of
extreme remedies featuring the rapid abandonment of all that is associated
with the prior system and a patronizing treatment of dissenting views. Those
previously victimized by a sometimes violent regime which failed to
observe its own laws may find themselves once again denied the ability
to take a responsible role in determining their social, economic, legal, and
political structures and to produce arrangements which truly reflect their
values and decisions.
II. LAW, CHAOS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF TOTALITARIANISM

The vision of the Soviet state as one which achieved an almost
unparalleled control of politics, economics, and the institutions of civil
society is also, of necessity, a view of a state that is extremely dependent
upon the institutions and channels of centralized control. Deterioration of
communication along these channels, or of other functions key to centralization, would seriously threaten the continuation of the system. Moreover, even without a deterioration in its functioning, such a centralized
mechanism might well be unstable due to the absence of diffused social
supports and sources of social strength:
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In such a constellation, all structure, order, organization, emanates from the centre. The moment central control fades, chaos
emerges, because there are no regulatory factors left. In pluralistic,
genuinely democratic societies there normally is a vast reservoir of
such forces. They can survive serious upsets in the sphere of politics
and economics because there are alternative mechanisms which can
take over without too much trouble. Curiously, the principle force
which holds a disintegrating totalitarian system together is the
universal and very realistic fear of chaos. 9
The perception of a realistic threat of chaos is an important insight.
Expressions of such fears have been routinely dismissed as disingenuous
scare tactics employed by those who will lose power or privilege as a
result of change.'0 This attitude was certainly prevalent with regard to the
Soviet Union and remains common with regard to Russia and the other
former Soviet republics. Commentators and advisors, especially., those
from Europe and the United States, consistently attribute the "too slow"
pace of change to the desire of the existing elite to remain in power and
discount the fears of disorder which are regularly expressed. As Russia
has encountered increasing political difficulty, the discounting of fears of
political chaos has somewhat decreased, but the practice continues
unabated with regard to fears of economic chaos.
Many of those who discount these possibilities believe that any
genuine fear of chaos is caused by a failure of those expressing it to
understand the ways in which the new political, economic, or social
arrangements will regulate behavior and to perceive that these new
arrangements will be superior to the old. According to their analysis, the
real threat of chaos is the possibility that those in positions of authority
will block beneficial change before it has a chance to be completed and
before the new, better system can begin to function. In part as a result of
this kind of reaction to "chaos fears," Russia has been continuously
pressed to increase the speed of political, social, and economic change
despite a clear lack of consensus and increasing social tension and
economic pain.
Feldbrugge's analysis seems to suggest nearly the opposite approach.
For Feldbrugge, the reality of the threat of chaos from systemic change
is a natural result of the extreme dependence of everything in the Soviet

9. Id. at 17.
10. The argument that change threatens to produce "chaos" - or at least a serious
breakdown of public order - is not unique to the Soviet context. The need to maintain public
order is commonly offered by political leaders as the reason for delaying, or avoiding altogether, reforms in political, social, and economic structures which are urged on them by others.
This occurs not only in regimes regarded as totalitarian, but also in those regarded as authoritarian and in those which are not regarded as either.
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Union on the apparatand its central power. Indeed, although he does not
say so explicitly, Feldbrugge's description of this dependence and the
absence of alternative institutions makes the threat appear to be not only
very realistic, but also a near certainty should significant portions of
central control be lost. This may explain in part the absence of prognoses
or recommendations on the path for change. Moreover, because
Feldbrugge's view of the Soviet system is one of a system both reprehensible and ultimately unsustainable, it would not appear to support a
resistance of chaos by any means which would maintain the power of the
center.
Although the two views appear to be near opposites in their analyses
of the possibility of chaos or the collapse of public order, both may
encourage an attitude toward change that fosters irresponsible suggestions
and a lack of concern for the reduction of the painful consequences of
change. Those who believe that the fears of chaos are the exaggerated or
wholly fictional claims of elites with vested interests may fail to listen
carefully to the reasoning behind the "scare tactics." Even when giving
the speaker the benefit of the doubt as to motive, such persons will often
discount the fears expressed as stemming from ignorance of the workings
of the proposed institutions and a resultant failure to perceive their own
best interest. They may not investigate the basis for these fears with any
care and are likely to urge change forward without attempting to address
the possible problem.
Feldbrugge's analysis, if read too broadly, may support precisely the
same outcome for exactly the opposite reason. If chaos is nearly inevitable, then there is little point in assiduously seeking to avoid it, and the
attempt to craft less painful strategies for change appears to be a rather
futile effort. Moreover, since the regime to be disposed of was extremely
undesirable, and the law and other institutions simply served the regime,
the legislation left over from that period will have been produced solely
to advance the cause of the totalitarian government. This suggests little
reason to show respect for those laws or the reliance they may have
produced and much cause to seek their immediate and wholesale replacement with laws which will protect individuals, democracy, and markets.
Another view on the fear of chaos might be provided by a more
"technical" analysis of the means by which the Soviet system - and Soviet
law in particular - regulated behavior. In many areas of legal regulation,
the Soviet legal approach simply did not follow the common Western
pattern in which the law defines the boundaries beyond which behavior
may not cross, but leaves a substantial area within the boundaries essentially
unregulated and does not interfere in behavior which falls within the
established parameters. In contrast to this proscriptiveregulatory pattern,
Soviet law in many important areas was directly prescriptive - it
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established specific and positive obligations in the area of regulation and
required that these obligations be met. The difference is not simply one
of the content of the law or the degree of regulation but is rather a
fundamental difference in approach to legal and social regulation. Movement away from one system and toward the other requires a clear understanding of this difference, and attempts at change which are blind to the
degree of dissimilarity may indeed promote a breakdown of public order.
By the same token, fears of chaos expressed by those within the Soviet
system may, at least in some instances, be reasonably understood as
expressions of awareness of the differences between the systems and a
signal that reform methods need to be reexamined.
Perhaps the easiest and best known example of the differences in Soviet
and Western patterns of legal regulation is the regulation of the economy.
With very limited exceptions, Soviet legal regulation of the economy was
accomplished by the establishment of specific, positive obligations on the
part of economic actors. An entity subject to this legal regulation 'would
be obligated to conclude contracts for specific goods or tasks with specific
contracting partners and then to perform those obligations properly. The
legal competence of the entity was extended only to those actions and
functions necessary for the entity to carry out its required tasks. Systems
for arranging the delivery of goods, for authorizing and processing payment,
and for carrying out other necessary functions in the economy were all
organized around the prescriptive principle - allowing an entity to take
only those actions which were consistent with its required tasks. Enforcement mechanisms and practices were geared toward early identifications
and preventions of failure to perform, and remedies were directed toward
the maintenance of the prescriptive order by reversal of inappropriate
transactions and legal enforcement of specific performance of required
tasks.
Because failure to fulfill legally imposed obligations was the primary
violation of the law, it was unnecessary for the law to define more general
limits on behavior. No general principles were required to define acceptable
business conduct among entities, as acceptable business conduct was
proscriptively defined. No limits needed to be placed by the law on the
authority of managers or on management self-dealing, as the system's
structure defined management's tasks specifically and prohibited any actions
outside them. Because of the prescriptive nature of the system, there was
no need for a wide variety of rules which are designed to set boundaries
on the independent exercise of authority or to prevent abuse of discretion,
and there was no need for the state to develop the institutions, practices,
and enforcement mechanisms that would permit it to police such boundaries. Recognition of the absence of such "proscriptive" norms explains

806
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another portion of the confusing debate over the concept that "everything
not prohibited is permitted." If there are few generalized prohibitions, this
principle appears, indeed, to be a recipe for chaos.
As Feldbrugge accurately describes, these systems were designed for
and functioned around a system of central control. As central control is
reduced, the old systems and mechanisms will work increasingly less well.
The most careful study of the technology, patterns, and effects of this
centralized legal regulation will not eliminate this problem nor is it likely
to yield perfectly painless strategies for change. However, it is important
that a generalized assumption that disorder must follow a reduction in
central political control not be permitted to blind analysts to the possibilities
for minimizing the problem that are offered by an understanding of the
existing structures and a respect for the desires, opinions, and instincts of
those operating within them.

